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Abstract. In this paper, we present an implemented system that enables au-
tonomous agents to engage in dialogues that involve inquiries embedded within
a process of practical reasoning. The implementation builds upon an existing for-
mal model of value-based argumentation, which has itself been extended to per-
mit a wider range of arguments to be expressed. We present extensions to the
formal underlying theory used for the dialogue system, as well as the implemen-
tation itself. We demonstrate the use of the system through a particular case study.
We discuss a number of interesting issues that have arisen from the implementa-
tion and the experimental avenues that this test-bed will enable us to pursue.
1 Introduction
Communication through argumentation is one of the key strands of work on compu-
tational argumentation. Work on agent-based dialogue systems has been greatly influ-
enced by the dialogue typology of Walton and Krabbe [12]. A number of proposals have
been set out for dialogue systems that encompass the main dialogue categories, for ex-
ample see: [4] for inquiry dialogues; [10] for negotiation; [9] for persuasion; [8] for
deliberation. However, very little work has been done on specifying and implementing
systems that combine two or more dialogue types. In [3] a formal framework was set out
for multi-agent dialogues over actions in which inquiry dialogues over beliefs are com-
bined with persuasion dialogues over actions. The dialogue system allows agents with
heterogeneous knowledge to each give input into a decision about how to act to achieve
a shared goal. The underlying representation of an argument is in terms of a formal
version of an argumentation scheme for practical reasoning, and critical questions that
agents can employ to challenge assertions made by their peers. Although this dialogue
system has been set out in a formal specification [3], it has not previously been validated
through an implementation. In this paper we present the details of an implementation
of this dialogue system for inquiry and persuasion over action. For a full implementa-
tion to be realised it was necessary to extend the formalism presented in [3] to enable a
richer set of arguments to be put forward, which we describe. The implemented system
we present provides not only a proof-of-concept in terms of an application of a formal
specification, but we also note a number of issues that have been identified through this
the exercise. Furthermore, we consider this implementation to be a starting point for
further investigations into agent argumentation dialogues, in particular, with respect to
coalition formation.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we recapitulate from [3] the back-
ground material about the dialogue system we have implemented. In Section 3 we
present new material that extends the formalism of [3] by providing the full list of
critical questions associated with the argumentation scheme that is used in the dialogue
system. In Section 4 we describe the implementation and demonstrate it with an ex-
ample. In Section 5 we discuss issues that have arisen from the implementation, future
avenues this work will allow us to explore and we conclude the paper.
2 Background
Our dialogue system allows agents to inquire about beliefs (to determine the state of
the world) and collectively perform practical reasoning over the an action to perform
in a given situation. To do this, agents in our system may have epistemic knowledge
(beliefs), represented by Garcia and Simari’s Defeasible Logic Programming [6], as
well as normative knowledge about the effects of actions.
The following definitions provide the formal framework for modeling beliefs.
Definition 1: A defeasible rule λ is denoted α1 ∧ . . . ∧ αn → α0 where αi is a
literal for 0 ≤ i ≤ n. A defeasible fact is denoted α where α is a literal. A be-
lief is either a defeasible rule or a defeasible fact. We define the following functions
DefeasibleSection(λ) = {α1, . . . , αn}; DefeasibleProp(λ) = α0.
The definition of a defeasible derivation is adapted from [6] to work with our as-
sumption that all beliefs are defeasible.
Definition 2: Let Ψ be a set of beliefs and α a literal. A defeasible derivation of α
from Ψ , denoted Ψ |∼ α, is a finite sequence α1, α2, . . . , αn of literals s.t.: αn is α;
and each literal αm (1 ≤ m ≤ n) is in the sequence because either αm is a defeasible
fact in Ψ , or there exists a defeasible rule β1 ∧ . . . ∧ βj → αm in Ψ s.t. every literal βi
(1 ≤ i ≤ j) is an element αk preceding αm in the sequence (k < m).
A b-argument is a minimally consistent set of beliefs from which a claim can be
defeasibly derived.
Definition 3: A b-argument is denoted B = 〈Φ, φ〉 where φ is a defeasible fact and Φ
is a set of beliefs s.t.: 1) Φ |∼ φ; 2) ∀φ, φ′ s.t. Φ |∼ φ and Φ |∼ φ′, it is not the case
that φ ∪ φ′ `⊥ (where ` represents classical implication); and there is no subset of
Φ satisfying (1 and 2). Φ is called the support of the b-argument and φ is called the
claim.
Each agent has a unique id x taken from a set I of agent identifiers. Each agent’s
belief base could be inconsistent.
Definition 4: A belief base of an agent x is a finite set of beliefs, denoted Σx.
For handling reasoning about the effects of actions, the following argumentation
scheme for practical reasoning is used, taken from [1]:
In the current circumstances R, we should perform action A, which will realise goal
G, which will result in the new circumstances S, which will promote some value V.
This scheme uses ‘values’ to describe a social interest an agent has, which will
be promoted by moving to a state in which goal G becomes true [2]. An agent may
propose an action including its justification by instantiating this scheme. Other agents
can then challenge instantiations by posing critical questions (CQ) associated with the
scheme. Seventeen critical questions are associated with the above scheme [1] which
raise potential issues with: the validity of the elements instantiated in the scheme; the
connections between the elements of the scheme; the side effects of actions; and the
possible alternatives.
In [3] an agent’s knowledge about the effects of actions is represented as a Value-
based Alternating Transition System (VATS), a modified version of an Action-Based
Transition System (AATS) [13], which has been extended to enable the inclusion of
values.
Definition 5: The VATS formalism is as follows: A VATS for an agent x, denoted Sx,
is a 9-tuple 〈Qx, qx0 , Acx, Avx, ρx, τx, Φx, pix, δx〉 s.t.:
– Qx is a finite set of states;
– qx0 ∈ Qx is the designated initial state;
– Acx is a finite set of actions;
– Avx is a finite set of values;
– ρx : Acx 7→ 2Qx is an action precondition function, which for each action a ∈ Acx
defines the set of states ρ(a) from which a may be executed;
– τx : Qx×Acx 7→ Qx is a partial system transition function, which defines the state
τx(q, a) that would result by the performance of a from state q. As this function is
partial, not all actions are possible in all states;
– Φx is a finite set of atomic propositions;
– pix : Qx 7→ 2Φx is an interpretation function, which gives the set of primitive propo-
sitions satisfied in each state: if p ∈ pix(q), then this means that the propositional
variable p is satisfied (equivalently, true) in state q; and
– δx : Qx ×Qx ×Avx 7→ {+,−,=} is a valuation function which defines the status
(promoted (+), demoted (−), or neutral (=)) of a value v ∈ Avx ascribed by the
agent to the transition between two states: δx(q, q′, v) labels the transition between
q and q′ with respect to the value v ∈ Avx.
Note, Qx = ∅ ↔ Acx = ∅ ↔ Avx = ∅ ↔ Φx = ∅.
With its VATS an agent can construct a-arguments for and against actions. Together
a-arguments and CQs are referred to as arguments over actions (AOAs).
Definition 6: An a-argument constructed by an agent x from its VATS Sx is a 6-tuple
A = 〈qx, a, qy, p, v, s〉 s.t.: qx = qx0 ; a ∈ Acx; τx(qx, a) = qy; p ∈ pix(qy); v ∈ Avx;
δx(qx, qy, v) = s where s ∈ {+,−,=}.
We define the following functions: Action(A) = a; Goal(A) = p; Value(A) = v;
EndState(A) = qy; Polarity(A) = s.
If Polarity(A) has the value +(−resp.), then we say A is an a-argument for (against
resp.) action a to achieve goal p. If Polarity(A) has the value “=”, then we say A is an
a-argument that is neutral with regards to action a.
Our framework assumes a closed cooperative multi-agent system. Agents collab-
orate to find the best action to achieve the dialogue initiator’s goal by entering a per-
suasion over action (pAct) dialogue, which provides the agents with an opportunity to
persuade the others by putting forward AOAs for the known possible actions. However,
before the AOAs can be asserted, each agent xmust inquire over its known propositions
so that its initial state can be found. Once this has occurred, the correct AOAs for the
current system state can be uttered. To find its initial state each agent x participating in
the dialogue first opens an inquiry (inq) sub-dialogue (i.e. a dialogue that is embedded
within a top-level dialogue) 3 with the other agents in the system. The result is a truth
value for all of agents x’s propositions that have not already been discussed in another
inq sub-dialogue.
Our dialogue is defined as a dialogue game. Dialogue games typically consist of
a set of communicative acts (called moves) and a set of rules that firstly state which
moves are legal for any point of the dialogue (the protocol), secondly define the effect
of making a move and a lastly determine when a dialogue terminates [7, 11]. Within
our framework, a dialogue denoted Dtr, is a sequence of moves mr, . . . ,mt where
r, . . . , t ∈ N represents the time-point at which each move was made, with r being
the starting point of the dialogue and t the end point. If r = 1, then this dialogue is
considered a top level dialogue whose type is pAct, which is opened by the dialogue
initiator. If the top level dialogue is closed then the dialogue game is over 4. If r 6= 1
then this is a sub dialogue whose type is inq. The following functions operate over a
dialogue5:
– Current(Dt1) returns the most recently opened dialogue that has not been closed.
– Type(Dtr) returns the type of the dialogue Dtr (i.e. pAct or inq).
– Initiator(Dtr) returns the agent who opened dialogue Dtr.
– Participants(Dtr) returns the set of agents in the dialogue Dtr.
– Topic(Dtr) returns the goal the agents are trying to achieve iff Type(Dtr) = pAct .
– Topic(Dtr) returns the set of propositions which the agents are jointly trying to find
the truth value of iff Type(Dtr) = inq .
– Turn(Dtr) returns the identifer of the agent whose turn it is.
The moves that the agents can perform are presented in Table 1. Agents take it in turns
to perform one move at a time. All agents’ assertions are stored in their commitment
stores (CS) that grow monotonically over time, as follows:
Definition 7: Commitment store update.
For a pAct dialogue with participants {x1, . . . , xn}, ∀x ∈ {x1, . . . , xn} and a commit-
ment store of agent x at time-point t denoted CStx,
CStx =
∅ iff t = 0,CSt−1x ∪ Υ iff mt = 〈x, assert, Υ 〉,
CSt−1x otherwise.
3 Further details of the inquiry sub-dialogues are discussed in Section 3.4.
4 For future work we will look into opening more than one pAct dialogue before the game is
over
5 Further dialogue details are given in [3].
Move Format
open 〈x, open, dialogue(θ, γ, Λ)〉
assert 〈x, assert, Υ 〉
close 〈x, close, dialogue(θ, γ, Λ)〉
Table 1. The format for moves used in this dialogue game, where x represents the agent making
the move and either θ = pAct and γ is a proposition (representing the dialogue goal), or θ =
inq and γ is a set of propositions (that the agent is inquiring over); Λ is a list of agents (Λ =
[x1, . . . , xn], {x1, . . . , nn} ⊆ I); Υ is either a set of a-arguments and critical questions (if
θ = pAct) or Υ is a set of b-arguments and beliefs (if θ = inq); and x is an agent (x ∈ I).
Definition 8: The union of all the commitment stores is defined as
CSs =
⋃
∀xi∈{x1,...,xn} CSxi .
Dialogues commence when an event triggers one agent to open a pAct dialogue
through its pAct strategy (see Section 3.5) to identify the best action to achieve a given
proposition p, where p = Topic(Dt1). The other agents that have been included in the
open dialogue move then initiate their individual pAct strategies, which are guaranteed
to find all the arguments related to the dialogue topic, via the use of the pAct protocol
(Section 3.3) and the inq protocol (Section 3.4), before terminating. Both dialogue types
will not complete until all agents have made a close move one after another without a
different move separating them, as this ensures that the dialogue does not terminate
until none of the agents have anything more they want to say.
Once the pAct dialogue has terminated, the system evaluates the arguments to de-
termine the maximally consistent acceptable set. This is achieved within our framework
using a Value-Based Argumentation Framework (VAF) [2], A VAF is an extension of
the argumentation framework (AF) of Dung [5]. In an AF an argument is admissible
with respect to a set of arguments S if all of its attackers are attacked by some argument
in S, and no argument in S attacks an argument in S. In a VAF, an argument succeeds
in defeating an argument it attacks only if its value is ranked as high, or higher, than
the value of the argument attacked; a particular ordering of the values is characterised
as an audience. Arguments in a VAF are admissible with respect to an audience A and
a set of arguments S if they are admissible with respect to S in the AF which results
from removing all the attacks that are unsuccessful given the audience A. A maximal
admissible set of a VAF is known as a preferred extension.
The output of evaluating a VAF is a recommended action (or non-action) that should
be performed to achieve the agents’ shared goal. An action can only be recommended
by the system if it is present in an AOA that is present in the preferred extension and
the AOA states that the action promotes a value. In the event that there is more than one
acceptable action the choice is offered to the dialogue initiator.
3 Extending the Formalisation of Critical Questions
The dialogue system set out in [3] handled only three of the possible seventeen criti-
cal questions associated with the practical reasoning argumentation scheme. Here we
extend the dialogue system by specifying all the necessary critical questions and show
their use within the dialogue system. The CQs formalised in Section 3.2 that follow
Definition 2 are as a-arguments also. All CQs can be asserted by any agent to challenge
an assertion of any other agent (including itself). If all agents follow the pAct protocol
then AOAs can only be asserted if they have not previously been asserted.
3.1 The State Comparison Definition
One particular issue that arose when implementing the dialogue system was the need for
a mechanism to clarify how agents who may be using different propositions to represent
the state of the world can accurately compare states (since agents’ VATS reflect only an
individual’s representation of the world). As such, we define that two agents, m and n
can compare their respective states qm ≈ qn iff pi(qm) ∩ Φn = pi(qn) ∩ Φm, otherwise
qm 6≈ qn. The intersection is used to eliminate propositions that reside in only one of
the agent’s beliefs.
When the above approximation holds, the two states qn and qm cannot reasonably
be said to be different, as both states will agree for each shared proposition. However,
these two states may not be identical as the same conclusion can be reached whatever
the truth assignments of the distinct propositions. If the comparison does not hold then
the states are different due to both agents holding inconsistent truth assignments for
their shared propositions.
This comparison requires either; each agent to have an internal model of the other
agent’s beliefs, or an instantiated state in an assertion should make explicit all the propo-
sitions that the agent holds to be true or false. Both will allow an agent to access the
beliefs of another. This paper chooses the latter option due to the ease of implemen-
tation of such a representation. There are no privacy issues for this framework as it
is designed for a closed and cooperative system. The following shows how the state
comparison definition works, when:
Φm = {p, q, r, t}, Φn = {p, r, v}, qm = [p,¬q,¬r, t], qn = [p,¬r, v]
The state comparison definition:
pi(qm) ∩ Φn = pi(qn) ∩ Φm
The substitution:
{p, t} ∩ {p, r, v} = {p, v} ∩ {p, q, r, t}
{p} = {p}
Conclusion : No evidence to suggest the states are necessarily different.
3.2 The Additional Critical Questions
We now define arguments that instantiate the remaining critical questions given in [1]
that are applicable to our framework (those that are not applicable are discussed subse-
quent to the presentation of the definitions). Within the formal definitions given below
we also give the natural language representation of the questions. Accompanying the
definitions are figures that illustrate a situation where each CQ could be posed. All il-
lustrations usually assume (unless otherwise stated) that both agents have in the initial
state ¬p (via the interpretation function), the pAct dialogue topic is to achieve p and
agent 1 takes the first turn.
Definition 9: A cq2-argument Answers the question ‘Assuming the circumstances,
does the action have the stated consequences?’. It is constructed from a VATS Sx and
denoted 〈qx, a, qy〉 s.t. qx = qx0 ; a ∈ Acx, τx(qx, a) = qy . It challenges an AOA
〈q′x, a′, q′y, p′, v′, s′〉 or an AOA 〈q′x, a′, q′y, v′, s′〉 iff qx ≈ q′x, a = a′, qy 6≈ q′y .
Fig. 1: Illustration of a cq2-argument (Definition 9) and a cq15-argument (Definition
21). Agent 2 will assert a cq-argument when agent 1 asserts an AOA to achieve p. The
cq-argument that agent 2 chooses depends on which formal conditions are met. No
value has been included for this example as values are not part of the definition of a
cq2-argument or a cq15-arguments.
Definition 10: A cq3-argument Answers the question ‘Assuming the circumstances,
and the action has the stated consequences, will the action bring about the desired
goal?’. It is constructed from a VATS Sx and denoted 〈qx, a, qy,¬p〉 s.t. qx = qx0 ;
a ∈ Acx; τx(qx, a) = qy; p /∈ (qy). It challenges an AOA 〈q′x, a′, q′y, p′, v′, s′〉 or an
AOA 〈q′x, a′, q′y, v′, s′〉 iff qx ≈ q′x, a = a′, qy ≈ q′y .
Fig. 2: Illustration of a cq3-argument (Definition 10). Agent 2 will assert a cq3-
argument when agent 1 asserts an AOA to achieve p. The initial state of Agent 1 is
[¬p,¬q] and the initial state of Agent 2 is [¬q].
Definition 11: A cq4-argument Answers the question ‘Does the goal realise the value
stated?’. It is constructed from a VATS Sx and denoted 〈qx, a, qy, p, v, s〉 s.t. qx = qx0 ;
a ∈ Acx; τx(qx, a) = qy; p ∈ pi(qy); v ∈ Avx; δx(qx, qy, v) 6= +; s ∈ =,−. It
challenges an AOA 〈q′x, a′, q′y, p′, v′, s′〉 iff qx ≈ q′x, p = p′, v = v′, s′ = +.
Fig. 3: Illustration of a cq4-argument (Definition 11). Agent 2 will assert a cq4-
argument when agent 1 asserts an AOA to achieve p.
Definition 12: A cq5-argument Answers the question ‘Are there alternative ways of
realising the same consequences?’. It is constructed from a VATS Sx and denoted
〈qx, a, qy〉 s.t. qx = qx0 ; a ∈ Acx; τx(qx, a) = qy . It challenges an AOA 〈q′x, a′, q′y, v′, s′〉
or an AOA 〈q′x, a′, q′y, p′, v′, s′〉 iff qx ≈ q′x, a 6= a′ , qy ≈ q′y .
Fig. 4: Illustration of a cq5-argument (Definition 12). Agent 2 will assert a cq5-
argument when agent 1 asserts an AOA to achieve p. No value has been included for
this example as values are not part of the definition of a cq5-argument.
Definition 13: A cq6-argument Answers the question ‘Are there alternative ways of re-
alising the same goal?’. It is constructed from a VATS Sx and denoted 〈qx, a, qy, p, v,+〉
s.t. qx = qx0 ; a ∈ Acx; τx(qx, a) = qy; p ∈ pi(qy); v ∈ Avx; δ(qx, qy, v) = +. It chal-
lenges an AOA 〈q′x, a′, q′y, p′, v′, s′〉 iff qx ≈ q′x, a 6= a′, p = p′, s′ = +.
Fig. 5: Illustration of cq6-argument (Definition 13), a cq7 argument (Definition 14), a
cq10 argument (Definition 17) and a cq-11 argument (Definition 18). Agent 2 will assert
a cq-argument when agent 1 asserts an AOA to achieve p. The cq-argument that agent
2 chooses depends on which formal conditions are met. The main difference between
CQ6 and CQ7 is whether the agent knows the new action achieves the goal (CQ6) or
not (CQ7).
Definition 14: A cq7-argument Answers the question ‘Are there alternative ways of
promoting the same value?’. It is constructed from a VATS Sx and denoted 〈qx, a, qy, v,+〉
s.t. qx = qx0 ; a ∈ Acx; τx(qx, a) = qy; v ∈ Avx; δ(qx, qy, v) = +. It challenges an
AOA 〈q′x, a′, q′y, p′, v′, s′〉 or an AOA 〈q′x, a′, q′y, v′, s′〉 iff qx ≈ q′x, a 6= a′, v = v′,
s′ = + .
See Fig. 5 for an illustration of example VATSs that could produce a cq7-argument.
Definition 15: A cq8-argument Answers the question ‘Does doing the action have
a side effect which demotes the value?’. It is constructed from a VATS Sx and denoted
〈qx, a, qy, v,−〉 s.t. qx = qx0 ; a ∈ Acx; τx(qx, a) = qy; v ∈ Avx; δx(qx, qy, v) = −.
It challenges an AOA 〈q′x, a′, q′y, p′, v′, s′〉 or an AOA 〈q′x, a′, q′y, v′, s′〉 iff qx ≈ q′x,
a = a′, v = v′, s′ = + .
Fig. 6: Illustration of a cq8-argument (Definition 15) and a cq9-argument (Definition
16). Agent 2 will assert a cq-argument when agent 1 asserts an AOA to achieve p. The
initial state of agent 2 is [¬p,¬q] and the side effect is q. The cq-argument that agent 2
chooses depends on which formal conditions are met.
Definition 16: A cq9-argument Answers the question ‘Does doing the action have
a side effect which demotes some other value?’. It is constructed from a VATS Sx
and denoted 〈qx, a, qy, v,−〉 s.t.: qx = qx0 ; a ∈ Acx; τx(qx, a) = qy; v ∈ Avx;
δx(qx, qy, v) = −. It challenges an AOA 〈q′x, a′, q′y, p′, v′,+〉 or an AOA 〈q′x, a′, q′y, v′, s′〉
iff qx ≈ q′x, a = a′, v 6= v′, s′ = +.
See Fig. 6 for an illustration of example VATSs that could produce a cq9-argument.
Definition 17: A cq10-argument Answers the question ‘Does doing the action have
a side effect which promotes some other value?’. It is constructed from a VATS Sx
and denoted 〈qx, a, qy, v,+〉 s.t.: qx = qx0 ; a ∈ Acx; τx(qx, a) = qy; v ∈ Avx;
δx(qx, qy, v) = +. It challenges an AOA 〈q′x, a′, q′y, p′, v′, s′〉 or an AOA 〈q′x, a′, q′y, v′, s′〉
iff qx ≈ q′x, a = a′, v 6= v′, s′ = +.
See Fig. 5 for an illustration of example VATSs that could produce a cq10-argument.
Definition 18: A cq11-argument Answers the question ‘Does doing the action pre-
clude some other action which would promote some other value?’. It is constructed
from a VATS Sx and denoted 〈qx, a, qy, v,+〉 s.t. qx = qx0 ; a ∈ Acx; τx(qx, a) = qy;
v ∈ Avx; δ(qx, qy, v) = + . It challenges an AOA 〈q′x, a′, q′y, p′, v′, s′〉 or an AOA
〈q′x, a′, q′y, v′, s′〉 iff qx ≈ q′x, a 6= a′, v 6= v′, s′ = +.
See Fig. 5 for an illustration of example VATS that could produce a cq11-argument.
Definition 19: A cq13-argument Answers the question ‘Is the action possible?’. It
is constructed from a VATS Sx and denoted 〈a〉 s.t. a /∈ Acx. It challenges any AOA
that includes q′x, a
′, q′y in its definition, iff a = a
′.
Fig. 7: Illustration of a cq13-argument (Definition 19). Agent 2 will assert a cq13-
argument when agent 1 asserts an AOA to achieve p. No values are shown as no values
occur in the definition of a cq13-argument.
Definition 20: A cq14-argument Answers the question ‘Are the consequences as de-
scribed possible?’. It is constructed from a VATS Sx and denoted 〈qx, a〉 s.t. qx = qx0 ;
a ∈ Acx; τx(qx, a) /∈ Qx. It challenges any AOA that includes q′x, a′, q′y in its defini-
tion, iff qx ≈ q′x, a = a′.
Fig. 8: Illustration of a cq14-argument (Definition 21). Agent 2 will assert a cq14-
argument when agent 1 asserts an AOA to achieve p. No values are shown as no values
occur in the definition of a cq14-argument.
Definition 21: A cq15-argument Answers the question ‘Can the desired goal be re-
alised?’. It is constructed from a VATS Sx and denoted 〈¬p〉 s.t. p ∈ Φx. It challenges
an AOA 〈q′x, a′, q′y, p′, v′, s′〉 iff p = p′ and (∀q ∈ Qx)(p /∈ pi(q)) .
See Fig. 1 for an illustration of example VATS that could produce a cq15-argument.
Definition 22: A cq16-argument Answers the question ‘Is the value indeed a legiti-
mate value?’. It is constructed from a VATS Sx and denoted 〈v,−〉 s.t. v /∈ Avx. It
challenges an AOA 〈q′x, a′, q′y, p′, v′, s′〉 or an AOA 〈q′x, a′, q′y, v′, s′〉 iff v = v′.
Fig. 9: Illustration of a cq16-Argument (Definition 22). Agent 2 will assert a cq16-
argument when agent 1 asserts an AOA to achieve p. No actions are shown as an action
does not occur in the definition of a cq16-argument.
Missing from the above list are CQ1 (are the believed circumstances true?), CQ12
(are the circumstances as described possible?) and CQ17 (is the other agent guaranteed
to execute its part of the desired joint action?); their omission is explained here.
We assume that cooperative agents all accept the outcome of the inquiry dialogues
and hence the representation issues concerning conflicting views of the initial state (as
raised by CQ1 and CQ12) will be resolved. Note that under this assumption the outcome
of the inquiry will be accepted by all agents even though it may be possible for an agent
to construct a relevant counter argument.
The actual reasons for agents accepting one b-argument over another should be
application dependant. For example in a safety critical system, the presence of one b-
argument for a safety critical proposition maybe enough to convince the agents to accept
that proposition over its negation. In other applications a simple majority vote could be
sufficient. Lastly CQ17 is omitted as the system is not currently concerned with joint
actions, though the use of an AATS lends itself to this, as we will explore in future
work.
3.3 Extending the pAct Protocol
The protocol this implementation uses, named the pAct protocol extends the one pre-
sented in [3] by including the extra critical questions so that the agents can use them in
a dialogue move. It returns the set of possible moves that are legal for each agent in the
dialogue when the current dialogue is of the type pAct.
The pAct protocol takes the top level dialogue from the set of all dialogues D, the
identifier of the agent from the set of all identifiers I and returns the set of legal moves
which is an element of the set of all subsets of the set of all movesM. These definitions
are the same for the inquiry protocol. Possible moves for an agent in the pAct dialogue
are: an assertion of an a-argument to achieve the dialogue goal; an assertion of a cq-
argument; a move to close the pAct dialogue or a move to open or close a nested inq
dialogue.
3.4 Defining the Inquiry Protocol
An Inquiry Protocol needs to be formally defined as the details were left out of [3]. This
protocol returns the set of possible moves that are legal for each agent in the dialogue
when the current dialogue is of the type Inq.
This protocol will not allow any proposition to become a claim of a b-argument
without supporting evidence. Supporting evidence takes the form of defeasible facts
or a fully supported defeasible rule. A defeasible rule λ is fully supported when there
is a defeasible derivation for the head of the rule that includes the rule and can be
constructed from the union of all the commitment stores.
The protocol works by firstly allowing each agent to assert all its relevant beliefs
that are not already present in the commitment store (Ξa(Dt1, x)). A belief can be either
a defeasible rule or a defeasible fact. A defeasible fact is relevant if it is an element
of the dialogue topic (Ξa (2)(ii,a)) or an element of a defeasible rule in the combined
commitment store of all the agents (Ξa (2)(ii,b)). A defeasible rule is relevant if its con-
sequent returns a defeasible fact that is an element of the dialogue topic (Ξa (3)(ii,a)) or
an element of another defeasible rule in the CSs (Ξa(3)(ii,b)). Secondly in Ξb(Dt1, x)
the agent checks to see if any of its asserted beliefs are now fully supported ( Φ ⊆ CSs).
If they are, these beliefs get asserted as b-arguments in the formB = 〈Φ, φ〉 if they have
not been already (B /∈ CSs). Each agent only asserts a b-argument with claim φ if it
asserted the belief that included φ (φ ∈ CStx). This is to eliminate multiple assertions
of b-arguments. Lastly if the agents cannot assert anything new then the only move that
will be returned is the ‘close dialogue’ move.
Definition 23: The Inquiry protocol is a function Ξ : D × I 7→ ℘(M). If Dt1 is
a top-level dialogue s.t. Current(Dt1) = D
t
r, Turn(D
t
r) = x, Participants(D
t
r) =
Λ = [x1, . . . , xn], CSs =
⋃
∀xi∈{x1,...,xn} CS
t
xi , Type(D
t
r) = Inq, Topic(D
t
r) =
ΦInitiator(D
t
r) and 1 ≤ t, then Ξ(Dt1, x) is
Ξa(D
t
1, x) ∪Ξb(Dt1, x) ∪ {〈x, close, dialogue(Inq, ΦInitiator(D
t
r), Λ)〉}
where
Ξa(D
t
1, x) = {〈x, assert, Φ〉|
(1) Φ 6= ∅ where Φ is a set of beliefs, and
(2) ∀φ ∈ Φ where φ is a defeasible fact:
(i) φ 6∈ CSs, φ ∈ Σx , and
either (ii,a) φ ∈ Topic(Dtr) ,
or (ii,b) ∃λ ∈ CSs s.t. φ ∈ DefeasibleSection(λ)
(3) ∀λ ∈ Φ where λ is a defeasible rule:
(i) λ 6∈ CSs, λ ∈ Σx , and
either (ii,a) DefeasibleProp(λ) ∈ Topic(Dtr) ,
or (ii,b) ∃λ′ ∈ CSs s.t. DefeasibleProp(λ) ∈ DefeasibleSection(λ′)
Ξb(D
t
1, x) = {〈x, assert, Υ 〉|
(1) Υ 6= ∅, Υ is a set of b arguments , and
(2) ∀B ∈ Υ : B = 〈Φ, φ〉 is a b-argument, Φ ⊆ CSs, φ ∈ CStx and B /∈ CSs
3.5 pAct Strategy
Agents of this system use the pAct strategy. This strategy either opens a pAct dialogue
if the agent is the dialogue initiator or selects one move out of the set of legal moves
returned from the correct protocol (the pAct protocol if Type(Current(Dt1)) == pAct,
else the inquiry protocol). The strategy is honest as agents assert only arguments that
can be constructed from their knowledge bases.
When using the pAct strategy, agents prefer a move to open an inquiry dialogue
over assert moves over close moves. This means that once the agents start asserting
AOAs, they already know the truth value of all their propositions, due to performing
an open inq dialogue move first and so all the AOAs presented in the subsequent pAct
dialogue relate to the actual world state. Also, as the close move is the least preferred
no agent will attempt to close the dialogue until it has run out of other moves and so the
dialogue is exhaustive.
4 Implementation
The implementation of the framework detailed in this paper uses the Java Agent DEvel-
opment Framework (JADE)6 to facilitate the storage, modelling and use of the agents’
epistemic and normative knowledge at runtime. The user can inspect: the initial Value-
based Argumentation Framework (VAF) that is used to evaluate the arguments produced
by the agents following the protocol; the preferred extension of the VAF; and the final
recommended action. Other elements that can be inspected include: the VATS of all the
agents in the dialogue; further details on both the b-arguments, a-arguments and critical
questions; and lastly the ability to view the complete resulting dialogue. In addition, the
user can modify the value order after the dialogue has terminated, which may result in
different recommended actions being generated.
Agents are modelled within a closed environment, and communicate by broadcast-
ing messages to other agents within the dialogue via a shared blackboard. The use of a
blackboard to record communicative acts eliminates the need for agents to individually
retain the dialogue history. Agents take turns to update the blackboard, to avoid the need
for complex coordination strategies.
6 http://jade.tilab.com/
All attacks between arguments in the VAF are computed after the dialogue has ter-
minated. As we assume a non-strategic approach, this allows agents to individually
assert all relevant arguments prior to the VAF determining the arguments acceptability
status. In future work we intend to investigate strategies.
Several issues were identified whilst developing a model to select a final recom-
mended action from the asserted AOAs. Since several critical questions concern prob-
lem formulation issues [1], not all arguments have an associated value (e.g. those de-
rived from CQ13, CQ15, CQ16); instead these arguments have been implemented to
automatically defeat any other argument that they attack, as they are assigned the value
‘truth’ which always ranks higher than any other value, according to [2].
Finally, scenarios can arise whereby b-arguments may claim logical contradictions
(e.g. p and ¬p). The current implementation resolves this issue by assuming that the
assertion holds (i.e. p) and the contradiction is ignored (i.e. ¬p). This conflict strategy
was selected because of time constraints but a conflict strategy should be chosen that
suits the particular application the dialogue system is deployed in.
4.1 Implementation example
Our system has so far been evaluated through the use of examples scenarios. One such
scenario will now be detailed to show how our system works at runtime.
Consider three agents engaged in a dialogue about the recent UK tuition fee debate.
These agents represent the student union SU (Figure 10), the University College Union
UCU (Figure 11) and the governmentGOV (Figure 12). There are three values present
in this simplified version of the debate: E representing the equality of future students
when compared to previous ones; JS representing job security for public sector edu-
cational workers; and NES representing national economic security. Along with these
values, there are two possible actions: raiseTuitionFeesUpFront representing raising
the tuition fees for all new students; and graduateTax representing a tax for all workers
who hold a degree.
Fig. 10: The VATS for SU . consensus represents if the majority of the student union
members are happy with the current fee level and edOnBudget represents if the educa-
tional system is currently on budget.
As shown by their respective VATS each agent has different views on this scenario.
The SU agent thinks raising tuition fees up front would unfairly affect future students
and thinks that a graduate tax would be a more appropriate alternative. SU ’s belief base
Fig. 11: The VATS for UCU . cutbacks represents if budget cutbacks are needed in the
majority of universities. edOnBudget remains the same as in Fig. 11.
Fig. 12: The VATS for GOV . debate represents that there is currently a parliamentary
review on how the educational budget can be improved. edOnBudget remains the same
as in Fig. 11.
is as follows:
ΣSU = {inFavourFees(X) > againstFees(Y )→ consensus,
inFavourFees(80%), againstFees(20%)}
The UCU agent does not think that implementing a graduate tax is a workable al-
ternative but on the other hand, it believes that no action will balance the educational
budget. UCU ’s belief base is as follows:
ΣUCU = {¬edOnBudget→ cutbacks}
Lastly the GOV agent does not view a graduate tax as a possible action but realises
that every value will be affected if it decides to raise the tuition fees.GOV ’s belief base
is as follows:
ΣGOV = {budgetReview ∧ educationalReview → debate,
budgetReview, educationalReview,
expenditure(X)≤ estimatedReturn(Y ) + acceptableLosses(Z)→ edOnBudget,
expenditure(X)> estimatedReturn(Y ) + acceptableLosses(Z)→¬ edOnBudget,
expenditure(13.1), estimatedReturn(7), acceptableLosses(3)}
The GOV agent tries to resolve the issue of what action (or non-action) should be
recommended by starting a dialogue with the goal being to achieve edOnBudget i.e.
keeping education spending on budget. The value order that is used in this example is
NES  JS  E. The dialogue order is SU followed by UCU and lastly GOV . For this
example CQ16 is not asserted since it is assumed that all the values are recognised by
all the agents.
Firstly the agents all open inquiry dialogues to find their correct state. Agent SU
opens an inquiry dialogue to find the truth values of consensus and edOnBudget.
The beliefs and b-arguments asserted are:
B1: (a defeasible rule asserted by GOV ) expenditure(X) ≤ estimatedReturn(Y )
+ acceptableLosses(Z)→ edOnBudget.
B2: (a defeasible rule asserted by SU ) inFavourFees(X) > againstFees(Y ) →
consensus.
B3: (a defeasible fact asserted by GOV ) expenditure(13.1).
B4: (a defeasible fact asserted by GOV ) estimatedReturn(7).
B5: (a defeasible fact asserted by GOV ) acceptableLosses(3).
B6: (a defeasible fact asserted by SU ) inFavourFees(80%).
B7: (a defeasible fact asserted by SU ) againstFees(20%).
B8: (a b-argument asserted by SU ) 〈{againstFees(20%), inFavourFees(80%),
inFavourFees(X) > againstFees(Y )→ consensus}, consensus 〉.
With no other b-arguments possible, the conclusion of this inquiry dialogue is that
only consensus is true in the current state. As no b-arguments could be generated
for edOnBudget and our implementation operates under the closed world assumption
then edOnBudget is presumed to be false.
For the inquiry dialogues all shared propositions are only discussed once because
the agents’ protocols are exhaustive and so each shared proposition would always find
the same truth value in each discussion.
The beliefs and b-arguments asserted in UCU ’s inquiry dialogue, which has been
opened to find/confirm the truth values of cutbacks and edOnBudget are:
B9: (a defeasible rule asserted by UCU ) ¬edOnBudget→ cutbacks.
B10: (a defeasible rule asserted by GOV ) expenditure(X) < estimatedReturn(Y )
+ acceptableLosses(Z)→¬ edOnBudget.
B11: (a b-argument asserted byGOV ) 〈{acceptableLosses(3), estimatedReturn(7),
expenditure(13.1), expenditure(X)> estimatedReturn(Y ) + acceptableLosses(Z)
→¬edOnBudget}, ¬edOnBudget 〉.
B12: (a b-argument asserted byUCU ) 〈{acceptableLosses(3), estimatedReturn(7),
expenditure(13.1), expenditure(X)> estimatedReturn(Y ) + acceptableLosses(Z)
→¬edOnBudget, ¬edOnBudget→ cutbacks}, cutbacks〉.
The beliefs and b-arguments asserted in GOV ’s inquiry dialogue, which has been
opened to find/confirm the truth values of debate and edOnBudget are:
B13: (a defeasible rule asserted by GOV ) budgetReview ∧ educationalReview →
debate.
B14: (a defeasible fact asserted by GOV ) budgetReview.
B15: (a defeasible fact asserted by GOV ) educationalReview.
B16: (a b-argument asserted by GOV ) 〈{educationalReview, budgetReview,
budgetReview ∧ educationalReview→ debate}, debate 〉.
After all the inquiry dialogues are complete, the agents will start to produce arguments
over what actions to perform using the pAct dialogue. The AOAs that are constructed
Fig. 13: VAF for the example dialogue. The nodes and edges represent the AOAs and
attacks repectively. Each edge is labelled with its attack type.
in this example are 7:
A1: (a-argument asserted by SU ) As we are in state [consensus,¬edOnBudget],
we should implement a graduateTax, which will achieve edOnBudget and promote
equality.
A2: (cq11-argument asserted by UCU ) As we are in state [cutbacks,¬edOnBudget],
we should raiseTuitionFeesUpFront which will promote job security.
A3: (cq13-argument asserted by UCU ) A graduateTax is not a possible action.
A4: (cq15-argument asserted by UCU ) Achieving edOnBudget is impossible.
A5: (cq5-argument asserted by GOV ) As we are in state [debate,¬edOnBudget],
raiseTuitionFeesUpFront, would achieve the same state as A1.
A6: (cq2-argument asserted by GOV ) As we are in state [debate,¬edOnBudget],
raiseTuitionFeesUpFront, would achieve different state to A2.
A7: (cq9-argument asserted by GOV ) As we are in state [debate,¬edOnBudget],
raiseTuitionFeesUpFront, would demote equality.
A8: (cq-6 argument asserted by GOV ) As we are in state [debate,¬edOnBudget], we
should raiseTuitionFeesUpFront which will achieve edOnBudget and promote na-
7 The formal characterisation of the dialogue is ommitted solely for reasons of space. The se-
mantic meaning of the arguments can be found in Section 3.2 and Definition 6. The full list of
attacks is visualised in Fig. 14.
tional economic security.
A9: (cq10-argument asserted by gov) As we are in state [debate,¬edOnBudget],
raiseTuitionFeesUpFront will promote national economic security.
Now after argument A9 the dialogue closes as the only further arguments that can be
asserted would be repetitions of information already present in the CS. As discussed
earlier, the full set of arguments put forward during the dialogue can now be organised
into a VAF that shows the attack relations between them, as can be seen in Figure 13.
Evaluating the VAF to determine which arguments are defeated yields the preferred
extension and the final recommended action as can be seen in Figure 14.
Fig. 14: The attack of A7 on A9 has not succeeded as A9 promotes a higher value than
A7 according to the audience. A9 is then recommended as it is the only argument that
promotes a value.
5 Discussion and Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have taken a formal specification of a dialogue system for inquiry
and persuasion over action, extended it, and subsequently implemented it to produce a
working agent dialogue system. Our contribution is in terms of the extended formalism
and the implemented system itself, with both providing grounds for future work.
The inclusion of additional critical questions enables agents to better identify ambi-
guities within their shared models, and thus construct additional arguments when look-
ing to find some consensus. However, the existence of these additional critical ques-
tions could also undermine the ability of agents forming some consensus. This is in
part due to the fact that in some contexts, all existing arguments could be defeated by a
carefully selected question which, when posed, may result in no recommended action.
Thus, it may be possible that the efforts of other agents to arrive at consensus may be
undermined by an agent that possesses flawed normative and/or epistemic knowledge.
Implementing the stages of practical reasoning from [1] may eliminate this problem,
as the first stage (problem formulation) would resolve representation issues, the second
stage (epistemic reasoning) would be represented by the inquiry dialogue and the third
stage (action selection) would be represented by the persuasion over action dialogue.
An interesting future extension to this work would be to see how this system could
be modified to allow for each agent to have its own preference order, instead of the
currently implemented single global preference order. This modification could lead to
a multi-agent system with self-interested agents, which could be further explored by
introducing aspects of coalition formation.
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